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Abstract. 
Iran was a textbook example of economic success in the two decades prior to the advent 
of the Islamic Revolution in 1979. But she has turned into an example of economic 
failure ever since. This study finds that nearly half of the 11 percent difference in 
economic growth in the two periods can be attributed to productivity. The study 
confirms the presents of significant productivity differentials in the two periods in the 
manufacturing sub-sectors and tries to explain it. To explain manufacturing productivity 
differentials in the two periods a Tonrquist measure of TFP, corrected for market 
imperfection and non-constant returns to scale technology, is constructed. On the issue 
of market imperfection it is found that Iranian manufacturing sectors suffers from a 
decreasing return to scale technology and mark-up pricing since 1979. In the cross 
section of 23 manufacturing sectors it is found the degree of market participation of the 
private sector versus public sector has the highest explanatory power in explaining 
sectoral productivity differentials. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Iran was a textbook example of successful economic development in the 60’s and the 
early 70’s. From 1959 to 1977 Iran’s real non-oil GDP per capita grew on average by 
6.8 percent, a rate that was truly exceptional before the rise of Asian tigers. By early 
seventies her GDP per capita exceeded that of Singapore and it was almost twice that of 
Turkey or South Korea. But the picture is very different today. In 1999, GDP per capita 
in Iran was equal or less than what it was some 27 years earlier in 1972 and 30 percent 
lower than its peak in 1976. Iran’s GDP per capita is now 85 percent of Turkey’s, 35 
percent of South Korea’s and 26 percent of Singapore’s (World Development Indicator 
2001 and Summers and Heston 1992). 
Being a major oil exporter, changes in oil prices explain part of the sharp 
variation in GDP per capita in Iran. The rise of oil prices following the Arab oil 
embargo of 1973-74 dramatically increased the income of oil exporting countries, 
including that of Iran. This helped the Iranian GDP to reach heights that had never been 
experienced before. The Iranian economy however, was enjoying a solid and continuous 
economic growth well before the rise in oil prices or the expansion of her extraction 
capacities in the late 60’s and the early 70’s. Iranian non-oil GDP per capita from 1955 
to 1970 on average grew by 4 percent a year. If this growth had continued Iranian GDP 
per capita would be close to that of England today. 
Some of the declines in per capita income can be attributed to the 1979 
revolution and the eight-year Iran-Iraq war. Iranian economy took a dive in 1978 with 
the outbreak of unrest that led to the Islamic revolution and it took another dive in the 
final years of the war in1986 and 1987, when Iraq targeted Iranian cities and its 
economic infrastructure. From 1977 to 1988, on average non-oil income per capita in 
Iran declined by 3.3 percent per annum. Iranian economy started to grow again once the 
war was ended in the mid 1988. The growth of GDP per capita averaged 5.3 percent for 
the first four years after the war; the period in which most of the war damaged 
infrastructure was reconstructed. But hopes for regaining the pre-1978 growth rates 
soon faded away as the economic growth slowed down in 1992. From 1992 to 1999, on 
average non-oil income per capita in Iran grew by less than half a percent per annum. 
The extent of economic failure since the 1978-79 revolution in general and its 
meager achievements in the 90’s when the state was not faced with any external or 
internal threat and the oil prices were in general favorable is puzzling. The failure is  
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puzzling because despite the war, vast amounts of investment were made in physical 
and human capital since the 1978-9 revolution (thanks to the oil revenue). Investment 
share of GDP, in the post 1979 era on average, was not less that the 1959-77 years.  
Investment share of GDP on average was 0.21 in both periods of 1959-77 and 1979-99.  
Massive investment was made in human capital since the 1978-79-revolution as it is 
evident by the achievements made in literacy and school enrolment rates. Literacy rate 
rose from 43 percent in 1975 to 72 percent in 1996. In the same period the number of 
student enrolled in the primary, secondary and the tertiary education increased from 93, 
45 and 5 percent to 98, 77 and 18 percent respectively
1 (WDI 2002).   
The primary goal of this paper is to find the sources of economic stagnation in 
Iran. In section 2, we identify the sources of the Iranian economic growth at the sectoral 
level. That is, we estimate the contribution of factor inputs and productivity by four 
major economic sectors to the overall GDP growth in Iran before and after the 1978-79 
Islamic revolution. The results of this section show that lower capital formation and 
lower productivity growth in the non-agricultural sectors of the economy are the main 
sources of economic stagnation in the years after the 1978-79 revolution. To get a better 
a better understanding of the productivity slow down in the industry, we focus on the 
manufacturing sector where a more detailed and reliable data set for analysis is 
available. First we measure the sources of productivity slow down in the manufacturing 
sector, and then we investigate the factors that affect productivity in the manufacturing 
sector. However we find that depending on the method of estimation and the 
assumptions the TFP results can be different. In section 3 we present a discussion of 
estimation methodology. In this section we present a methodology for estimating 
manufacturing TFP growth rates at sub-sectoral levels under the standard assumptions 
of perfect competition and constant returns to scale (CRS). Then we present a 
methodology for testing the impacts of various macroeconomics and institutional as 
well and industry specific variables on manufacturing TFP growth. Finally, we present a 
methodology for estimating TFP growth rates under market imperfection and non-CRS. 
Data sources are discussed in section 4. The results are presented in section 5. First the 
standard Tornquist measures of TFP growth rates are presented then by relaxing the 
standard assumptions of perfect competition and constant returns to scale technology 
                                                 
1 On the investment on the educational system in Iran during the 1990’s, see the World Bank Report No. 
13233-IRN: Islamic Republic of Iran: Education, Training and the Labor Market, 26 July 1996, pp. 23-
56.   
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the mark up and scale parameters are estimated and used to construct the “true” TFP 
growth rates. And finally using a set of macroeconomic and sector specific variables an 
attempt is made to explain variations in manufacturing standard and “true” TFP growth 
rates. And finally the paper is concluded in section 6. 
 
2.   Sources of growth: a gross approximation at broad sectoral level 
 
If productivity growth is in fact the main source of high GDP growth rates before the 
1978-79 revolution and low growth rates afterward then we should be able to confirm 
and illustrate this at the sectoral level. Once the lagging industry is identified we can 
look for the sources of economic malfunctioning at a more micro level and then 
generalize the main conclusions to the rest of the economy. We employ the standard 
growth accounting method to calculate TFP growth rates in various sectors. To start, 
consider the following Cobb-Douglas production function:  
 
       0 1 ) (





it it it L H K A Y      ( 1 )  
 
where Yit, Kit, Hit and Lit respectively denote output, physical capital stock, human 
capital and labor of sector i at time t. Ait denotes Hicks-neutral technological change or 
TFP.  
  Log differentiation and then re-arrangement of equation (1) gives the following 
equation for TFP growth. 
 
 dTFPit = (dA/A)it = (dY/Y)it – α(dK/K)it – (1-α)[(dH/H)it + (dL/L)it]    (2) 
 
The sectors considered here are agriculture, oil and gas, industry and services. 
Relative importance of these sectors in terms of their contribution to GDP can be 
studied   
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Table 1. Sectoral value added shares*     
      1966-76  1976-86  1986-96  2000 
All  economy      
    Agriculture  0.17  0.19  0.24  0.23 
    Oil and gas  0.37  0.24  0.14  0.14 
    Industries  0.14  0.18  0.20  0.20 
        Manufacturing and Mining   0.07  0.10  0.13  0.16 
    Services  0.32  0.39  0.40  0.43 
Non-oil  economy       
    Agriculture  0.28  0.24  0.28  0.28 
    Industries  0.22  0.24  0.24  0.27 
        Manufacturing and Mining   0.11  0.13  0.15  0.18 
    Services  0.50  0.52  0.48  0.45 
* Constant 1982 prices are used for calculating average shares 
 
from Table 1 where GDP share of each sector is given for three time periods of 1966-
75, 1976-85, and 1986-95 and also 2000. As it can be seen from the table oil and gas 
used to be the largest sector in terms of value added in the 1960’s and the 1970’s but its 
importance has declined continuously in the last two decades. The relative share of non-
oil sectors have increased as the share of oil sector has gone down. However, sectoral 
shares seem to be relatively stable in the non-oil par of the economy in the last 30 years. 
Industry seems to be an exception. Industry share of non-oil GDP has increased from 11 
percent in 1966 to 18 percent in 2000.  
 
Table 2. Growth decomposition in the non-oil economy    
 Average annual growth rate (percent)     
        1966-76 1976-86 1986-96 1976-96 
Growth  rate  of      
   Value added  13.1  0.7  3.9  2.3 
   Employment  3.1  1.7  3.1  2.4 
   Physical capital  15.1  5.6  2.6  4.1 
   Index of human capital  0.8  0.9  1.1  1.0 
Contribution  of      
   Employment  2.1  1.2  2.1  1.6 
   Physical Capital Stock  5.0  1.8  0.9  1.3 
   Human Capital  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.7 
Growth rate of total factor productivity*with and without human capital in the formula     
   Including human capital  5.6  -2.9  0.3  -1.3 
   Excluding human capital  6.1  -2.3  1.0  -0.7 
*Alpha is assumed to be 0.33       
 
Table 2 presents the growth rates of value added, employment, physical capital, 
the index of human capital and the calculated measure of TFP in the non-oil part of 
Iranian economy. These figures are calculated for 1966-76, 1976-86, and 1976-96 
periods for which data on employment by sector is available (from the census data).  
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Capital stock is estimated using perpetual inventory method. The estimates are based on 
some crude assumptions on the capital output ratios in 1956 when our data on 
investment series begins. Allowance was made for the destructive effects of the 8-year 
Iran-Iraq on capital stock. Based on the estimates of the Plan and Budget Organization, 
higher depreciation rates were assumed for the war period. The index of human capital 
is from Collins and Bosworth (1996). In the calculation of total productivity, labor 
elasticity of output is set equal to 0.67. This estimate is based on the share of labor 
compensation to value added in the 1984 input-output table of Iran (after adjusting for 
proprietors, income). 
There is a sharp contrast between the performance of Iranian economy before 
and after 1976. From 1966 to 1976 the non-oil part of Iranian economy grew at a 
staggering rate of 13.1% per annum. In the following two decades this figure fell to 
0.7% and 3.9% respectively. From 1976 to 1996 the non-oil part of Iranian economy 
grew at an average annual rate of 2.3 percent. This is 10.8-percentage points less than 
the growth rate achieved in the previous period. What are the sources of this difference? 
Capital accumulation rates in the 1966-76 period are indeed very high compared to the 
1976-96 rates or any international standards for that matter. However only 7.2-
percentage point of 13.2% growth in the 1966-76 period can be attributed to factor 
inputs and the remaining 5.6 points should be credited to productivity growth. In fact 64 
percent of the difference in economic performance in the two periods can be attributed 
to differential productivity performance and 33 percent to physical capital 
accumulation. This illustrates the significance of productivity in the current economic 
stagnation in Iran. 
In search for the sources of growth it would be interesting to know how various 
economic sectors have contributed to total economic growth and what their sources are. 
Table 3 presents GDP growth by sector and factor components. The labor elasticity of 
output is set equal to 0.74 in the agricultural sector, 0.07 in the oil and gas, 0.65 in the 
industry and 0.64 the service sectors. These estimates are based on labor compensation 






Table 3.  Average annual growth rate of value added, labor, capital and productivity by
sector (percent) 
        1966-76 1976-86 1986-96 1976-96 
Value  added       
    Agriculture  6.5  4.5  3.7  4.1 
    Oil and gas  11.6  -11.5  6.2  -3.1 
    Industry  18.4  -1.4  5.7  2.1 
    Services  14.5  0  3.1  1.6 
Weighted avg. of all sectors 12.6  -2.2  4.2  1.2 
Weighted avg. of non-oil sectors  13.2  0.7 3.9 2.3 
        
Employment      
    Agriculture  -0.5  0.6  0.5  0.6 
    Oil and gas  3.4  2.1  4.6  3.3 
    Industry  6.2  -1.6  5.1  1.7 
    Services  4.8  5.3  3.3  4.3 
        
Capital  Stock      
    Agriculture  14.9  2.5  1.4  2.0 
    Oil and gas  12.8  2.5  -0.2  1.1 
    Industries  23.2  3.3  4.7  4.0 
    Services  14.3  6.5  2.3  4.4 
        
Total  Factor  Productivity*       
    Agriculture  3.1  3.4  3.0  3.2 
    Oil and gas  -0.5  -14.0  6.1  -4.3 
    Industry  6.3  -1.5  0.7  -0.4 
    Services  6.3  -5.7  0.2  -2.8 
Weighted avg. of all sectors  3.2  -5.3  1.8  -1.4 
Weighted avg. of non-oil sectors  5.4 -2.3 1.1 -0.6 
*Labor elasticity is 0.74 for agriculture, 0.07 for oil, 0.65 for industry and 0.64 for     
  services. 
 
The significance of the oil sector in the Iranian economy is evident from the 
table. In general growth rates are higher in periods in which oil income is higher (i.e., 
1966-1976 and 986-1996 periods), and lower in other periods (i.e., 1976-86 years). 
However, as it is evident from the weighted averages of the non-oil sectors of the 
economy this impact does not override other economic forces. The value added and 
productivity growth rates before 1976 are much larger than the ones after 1976. In 
addition, as the economy grows larger the importance of oil sector becomes smaller. In 
the 1966-76 years, value added share of the oil and gas sector was 43%. This figure 
dropped to 17% in the 1976-96 years and 14% in 2000.   
Productivity growth rates are generally high for the 1966-1976 years and low for 
the 1976-96 years (see Table 4 for an international comparison). Value added weighted 
average of sectoral productivity is 3.2% in the 1966-76 period compared to –1.4% in the 




Table 4. Comparative productivity growth statistics 
Country   Period  Sector    TFP  growth rate (% per year) 
South Korea (1)    1963-79  Mfg.    6.1   
South Korea (2)  1971-89  Mfg.    3.7   
   1971-89  Service    1.7   
Taiwan (3)   1966-90  Mfg.    1.4   
   1966-90  Service    2.6   
Singapore (4)  1986-95  Mfg.    4.0   
Malaysia (5)  1985-96  Mfg.     3.4    
1- Dollar and Sokoloff (1990)    4-Maison Abdullah el. al (2001) 
2- Moon, Jo Whong and Kim (1991)  5-Ower and Abdullah (2000) 
3- Alwyn Young (1995)    
 
The presence of the oil sector makes the application of our simple growth 
accounting exercise somewhat complicated. Much of the value added in the oil sector 
cannot be attributed to labor and capital input. But in the absence of a “resource factor”, 
growth in the value added is attributed to the growth rate of labor, capital or 
productivity
2. One way to get around this problem is to exclude the oil and gas sector 
from our growth calculations
3. Using this measure we see that the productivity growth 
differences in the two periods of before and after the 1978-79 revolution is even higher. 
The growth rate of non-oil economy in the 1966-76 years was 5.42% compared to –
0.6% in the 1976-96 years, a massive decline of more than 6% per annum!  
In the 1966-76 period the industry and the service sectors have the same 
extraordinary productivity growth rate of 6.3 percent. Productivity in the agriculture 
sector is about half of this figure and yet very high by any standard. In the 1976-86 
period productivity growth rates are over 7.7 -percentage points lower in the non-oil 
sector of the economy. This period contains a revolution and 6 years of an eight-year 
destructive war with Iraq.  
Agriculture however seems to be an exception to the general trend of falling 
productivity in this period. Productivity improvement in agriculture seems to be 
                                                 
2 Labor compensation was only 3% of value added in the oil sector in 1984 and 7% in 1996. 
3 Contribution of the oil sector to the overall growth rate of the economy is obviously beyond its value 
contribution to GDP.  Oil revenue comprises near 60 percent of total government revenue in Iran, a fact 
that has not changed much over the last 30 years. With the decline in the oil revenue, primarily the 
development share of government expenditure (call it public investment) has decreased.  Public oil 
income elasticity of public development expenditure is estimated to be 0.68. That is for every $10 
increase in public oil revenue, public development expenditure increases by nearly $7. Therefore lower 





continuing and even increasing in this period. Unlike the other sectors agriculture was 
not very much affected by the revolution and the war. Following the 1978-79 revolution 
all the commercial banks, insurance companies and almost all of the large 
manufacturing firms (and some medium sized firms) were nationalized or simply 
confiscated in Iran. Some land confiscation also took place but by the time of the 
revolution there were not many large scale private farming around any way. Large scale 
land ownership in agriculture came to an end in Iran following the land reform in the 
early 1960’s. In fact, aside from a few public agro-business units, agriculture is the only 
sector that is truly private in Iran. 
The 1986-96 period covers the final two years of the Iran-Iraq war and eight 
years of post war period. In this period the negative productivity growth rates of the 
previous decade are turned into positive numbers and the high productivity 
improvements in agriculture is more or less sustained. The productivity gains in the 
non-oil and non-agricultural part of the economy are quite disappointing. In the industry 
and the services productivity growth rates are 5.5 and 6.1 percentage point lower than 
their respective growth rates in 1966-76. In sum the growth rate of non-oil economy 
after the revolution is about 11 percentage points lower than the earlier period where 
more than half of which (6.2 percentage point) can be attributed to the loss productivity.  
Table 5 shows the decomposition of sectoral growth and its contribution to the overall 
growth. It can be seen from the table that the growth rate of the non-oil economy in the 
1976-96 period is 6.5 percentage points less than the 1966-76 period of which almost 4 
percentage points can be attributed the reduction of productivity growth and 2.4 points 
can be attributed to the lower growth rate of capital accumulation. At the sectoral level, 
two-third of the 6.5 percentage point difference in growth performance in the two 
periods comes from sluggish growth rate of services and the remaining one-third comes 
from sluggish growth rate in the industry. Of the 2.2 percentage point of the reduction in 
non-oil economic growth performance that can be attributed to the industrial sector 
about half comes from lower capital accumulation and half from lower productivity 
growth. In other words although industry comprise only 20 percent of Iranian GDP in 
2000 and its share of output was even smaller in the past few decades, its contribution to 
growth or demise of Iranian economy is about 30 percent, half of which can be 




Table 5. Decomposition of growth contribution to GDP by sector 
              Average annual growth rate (percent)    
      1966-76  1976-86  1986-96  1976-96 
Value added         
    Agriculture  1.1  0.8  0.9  0.8 
    Oil and gas  4.3  -2.8  0.9  -0.7 
    Industry  2.6  -0.3  1.2  0.4 
    Services  4.6  0.0  1.3  0.6 
    Total  12.6  -2.2  4.2  1.2 
    Non-oil sum  8.3  0.6  3.3  1.9 
Employment        
    Agriculture  -0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1 
    Oil and gas  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0 
    Industry  0.6  -0.2  0.7  0.2 
    Services  1.0  1.3  0.8  1.0 
    Total  1.5  1.2  1.7  1.4 
    Non-oil sum  1.4  1.2  1.6  1.4 
Capital Stock         
    Agriculture  0.7  0.1  0.1  0.1 
    Oil and gas  4.4  0.6  0.0  0.2 
    Industry  1.1  0.2  0.3  0.3 
    Services  1.6  0.9  0.3  0.6 
    Total  7.8  1.8  0.7  1.2 
    Non-oil sum  3.4  1.2  0.8  1.0 
Total Factor Productivity       
    Agriculture  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.6 
    Oil and gas  -0.2  -3.4  0.9  -0.9 
    Industry  0.9  -0.3  0.2  -0.1 
    Services  2.0  -2.2  0.1  -1.1 
    Total  3.2  -5.3  1.8  -1.4 
    Non-oil sum  3.4  -1.9  1.0  -0.5 
 
Service and industry are clearly the lagging sectors in the Iranian economy 
responsible for almost the entire decline in the performance of the non-oil economy. 
And productivity explains two-third of that. In the quest for the sources of economic 
growth in Iran it would have been informative if we could pursue the question of 
productivity in a more detailed level in the service sector. Data at sub-sectoral level is 
not available for the service sector in Iran. In addition measurement of output in service 
sector is quite murky particularly in an economy such as Iran that public sector is large. 
Sensitivity of government expenditure (hence the measured TFP figures) to oil revenues 
from oil exports makes the TFP growth measures for the service sector less reliable. In 
contrast a continuum of manufacturing surveys is available in Iran that allows us to 
study the manufacturing sector in 3 or 4-digit ISIC level. We pursue the question of 
falling GDP per capita and productivity in the manufacturing sector in the next two 




3.  Methodology 
3.1 TFP measurements under CRS and perfect competition  
  
First we must establish a methodology for calculating TFP across sectors in discrete 
time. Consider the following production function: 
 
Qit = AitFi(Kit, Lit, Mit)    where i=1, 2, 3,...,n      (3) 
 
Output, Qit, in sector i is produced with labor, Lit, capital Kit, and materials Mit as inputs. 
Ait is an industry specific index of Hicks-neutral technical change. Totally 
differentiating (3), and dividing through by Qit, we have: 
 
dQ/Qit = (∂Q/∂L)(dL/Q)it + (∂Q/∂K)(dK/Q)it 
                      + (∂Q/∂M)(dM/Q)it + (dA/A)it        (4) 
 
Under perfect competition the value of marginal product is equal to the factor price. Therefore, 
the elasticity of output with respect to input can be replaced by factor income share in the value 
of sectoral output. That is, 
 
(wL/pQ)it = (∂Q/∂L)(L/Q)it       ( 5 a )    
(rK/pQ)it = (∂Q/∂K)(Κ/Q)it       ( 5 b )  
(nM/pQ)it = (∂Q/∂M)(M/Q)it       ( 5 c )  
 
where p is output price and w, r and n are factor prices of labor, capital and materials 
respectively. Substituting (5a)-(5c) into 4 and rearranging terms, we have 
 
dQ/Qit = (wL/pQ)(dL/L)it + (rK/pQ)(dK/K)it + (nM/pQ)(dM/M)it  
     + (dA/A)it           ( 6 )  
 
We shall denote the labor and materials shares of output as θL and θM. Under constant 
returns to scale the factor shares would sum to 1, hence capital share is simply equal to 
one minus the sum of labor and material share of output (i.e., θK = 1- θL - θM). Using the 




dTFPit = (dA/A)it = dQ/Qit - θLit(dL/L)it - θMit(dM/M)it  
   - (1- θLit - θMit)(dK/K)it       ( 7 )  
 
To make this operational we replace dZ/Zt by lnZt-lnZt-1and θzt with average factor share 
(1/2)(θzt  +  θzt-1) which is denote it byθz. Finally we arrive at the Tornquist index 
number formula for TFP growth as the following: 
 
dTFPit = [lnQit - lnQit-1] – [θLi (lnLit - lnLit-1)  + θMi (lnKit - lnKit-1)   
   + (1-θLi -θMi)(lnKit - lnKit-1)]     (8) 
 
Now, given the Tornquist index of TFP growth we test for the significance of 
factors deemed to be influential on growth rate of productivity. Conceptually, the 
factors than can influence sectoral productivity growth are either common to all sectors 
or sector-specific. Therefore, we can specify the following general equation in testing 
for  
the determinants of TFP growth rates:  
 
dTFPit =   αi  + bSt  + cZit  + uit                 (9) 
 
St is a vector of macroeconomic or institutional variables that can affect productivity in 
all sectors. Zit is a vector of certain characteristics of each industry i at time t that can 
influence TFP growth, variables such as share of R&D expenditures or share of skilled 
labor in each industry i at time t. αi captures sector-specific productivity changes that 
vary over sectors but not over time. Bold-faced characters b and c are vectors of 
parameters and uit is an independently and identically distributed random component 
term. 
  However, as we will see in the description of the data, time series data on 
industrial characteristics are not available. Therefore, instead of time-series cross 
section equation (9) the following two equations, where one is time series and the other 
cross sections will be employed. 
 
dTFPt =  α1 + bSt   + ut                   (10)  
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dTFPi =   α2  + cZi  + ui                   (11) 
 
Variables on the left hand side of the two above equations are Tornquist measures of 
TFP growth rate. dTFPt measures productivity growth rate of total manufacturing in 
time t and dTFPi measures average of productivity growth rate in sector i for a given 
time period.  
 
3.2  TFP Measurement under non-CRS and imperfect competition 
 
Hall (1988) shows that when the assumptions of perfect competition and constant 
returns to scale are relaxed, the standard measure of TFP no longer reflects the true 
productivity growth any more. Following Harrison (1994) extension of the Hall model, 
in this section first we provide a framework in which imperfect competition and non-
CRS behavior can be tested for. Then we present a new formulation for Tornquist index 
of TFP growth corrected for imperfect competition and non-CRS behavior. This 
adjusted TFP measure will subsequently be used to test for the determinants of 
manufacturing TFP growth.  
When there is imperfect competition, firms with market power do not set the 
value of marginal product equal to the factor price. In that case the output elasticity of 
factor exceeds factor share by a multiple of markup price factor µ. Then equation (6) 
must be replaced by the following equation     
 
dQ/Qit = µi [(wL/pQ)(dL/L)it + (rK/pQ)(dK/K)it + (nM/pQ)(dM/M)it]  
  +  (dA/A)it           ( 1 2 )  
 
Under CRS, the factor shares would sum to 1/µ but when we allow for non-CRS the 
sum of factor shares would equal to β/µ, where β may be less than, equal to or greater 
than one. Rewriting (12):     
 
dQ/Qit = µixit  + βi(dK/K)it + (dA/A)it      ( 1 3 )  




Lower case variables l and m are equal to ln(L/K) and ln(M/K). Then the true TFP 
growth (dTFP*) is, 
 
dTFPit* = dQ/Qit - µixit  - βi(dK/K)it      ( 1 4 )  
 
The extend of the bias is equal to 
 
dTFPi - dTFPi* = (µi -1)xi  + (βi -1)(dK/K)it     (15) 
 
Therefore, when x is negative (e.g., capital grows at a faster rate compared to labor and 
material inputs) and the mark up prices are positive, then productivity gains are 
understated if there is constant or decreasing return to scale.  
Thus equation (13) can be used to determine the degree of economy of scale and 
competitiveness of an industry. However, this equation suffers from an endogeneity 
problem since inputs and output are determined simultaneously. In order to control for 
at least part of this the endogeneity problem, we assume that the Hicks neutral 
technological change parameter is a random variable of the following form: 
 
Ait = Ai0 exp(φitt)  
dA/A it =  φit = ai + λt + uit         ( 1 6 )  
 
where Ai0 is the technological level of industry i at the beginning, period 0, and φit is the 
growth rate of technological change. Thus the growth rate of the technological change 
of industry in i period t consists of an industry-specific growth rate, ai, and a period 
specific growth rate, λt, which captures the macroeconomic shock which is common 
across industries in the same period, plus a white noise, error term uit. Substituting 
equation (16) into equation (13) we will get 
 
dQ/Qit = ai + λt + µixit  + βi(dK/K)it + uit     ( 1 7 )  
 
The sum of the estimated industry-specific effects and period specific effects can be 
interpreted as the expected value of the growth rate of productivity of the industry i in 
the period t relative to the base year.  
 
14
  Now we can incorporate the mark-up factor, µ, and the returns to scale 
parameter,  β, in the definition equation (8) and rewrite an equation for the “true” 
Tornquist index number of TFP growth, dTFP*, as the following: 
 
dTFPit* = [lnQit - lnQit-1] – µi [θLi (lnLit - lnLit-1) + θMi (lnMit - lnMit-1)   
   + (µi /βi - θLi - θMi)(lnKit - lnKit-1) ]      ( 1 8 )  
 
Subsequently we can substitute the new estimate of TFP growth for the standard TFP 
figures in equations (10) and (11) to test for the determinants of manufacturing 
productivity growth.  
 
4.  Data and sources 
 
Measurements of sectoral productivity growth rates require data on output, labor input, 
capital input, intermediate input, and factor shares. I obtained manufacturing data from 
Statistical Center of Iran (SCI). Data on output, intermediate input, labor input and 
factor shares were obtained from SCI. I have used data on manufacturing industries with 
ten employees or more. Firms with less than 10 workers although comprise 75 percent 
of total firms in Iran but they produce only 16 percent of manufacturing value added 
(based on 1995 data). 
There was no estimate of manufacturing capital stock available at the sectoral 
level. I constructed capital stock by type (machinery and equipment, building, and the 
other) and by sector using a standard perpetual inventory model. The data on 
manufacturing investment is obtained from CSI and the totals are reconciled with 
Central Bank’s data on the purchase of investment goods by type. Data on price 
deflators are from Central Bank of Iran (CBI). 
  I obtained annual data for 9 two-digit industry groups (ISIC Rev. 2) for the years 
1971-76 and 27 three-digit industry groups for the years 1979-98 (ISIC Rev. 2 for years 
1979-93 and ISIC Rev. 3 for years 1994-98). For the two missing years I used data from 
CBI and rescaled them to reconcile with CSI data. Data in 2 digit ISIC data on 
manufacturing is available from 1971 onward. Since 1980, SCI has conducted census 
survey on manufacturing products. At the time of the study however, I had access only  
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to the 1995 census report, which is one of the most comprehensive industrial surveys 
conducted by SCI.  
  In the absence of producer price indexes (PPI) I have deflated manufacturing 
and output and value added data using wholesale price indexes (WPI). The items on 
WPI are limited and the definitions do not quite match with those of industrial 
classification. To match the two definitions, a new index using 1986 Input-Output table 
was constructed. Then the constructed price index was amended with the PPI series 




5.  TFP growth estimation  
5.1 The “standard” measure of TFP growth 
 
Table 6 presents factor productivity growth estimates for Iran’s 7 major manufacturing 
industries for four sub-periods during 1972-1998 years. Annual sectoral TFP growth 
rates are given in the appendix. Relative importance of these sectors in terms of value 
added generated and employment is given in Table 7. Value added weighted average of 
all manufacturing is given at the bottom of the table.  It seems that the TFP measure of 
chemicals is strongly influenced by oil prices and war destructions. The weighted 
average is also reported for manufacturing exclusive of chemicals. According to Table 
6, sectoral TFP growth rates in the 1972-98 period averaged 0.5% per annum under the 
standard assumption of perfect competition and constant returns to scale.  
The manufacturing TFP growth rates in the 1972-98 can be divided into three 
distinct periods of pre revolution 1972-77, revolution and war 1978-88 and the post war 
period 1989-98. Total manufacturing TFP growth rate in the pre-revolution period 
averaged 3.3% per annum (4.7% exclusive of chemicals). This is quite impressive by 
any standard. The productivity growth rate of machinery and non-metallic mineral 
products in particular are astounding. The TFP of these sectors grew by 8.1% and 5.8% 
per annum in  
the 1972-77 years. Productivity growth rates fell sharply in the 1978-88 period. In this 
period total manufacturing TFP growth rate averaged –1.7% per annum (-3.3% 
exclusive of chemicals). The fastest growing sectors in the 1972-77 period, i.e., the 
                                                 
4 A two-tier approach was also tried for deflating value added via creating yet another set of price indexes 
for intermediate inputs. But the results were disappointing.  
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machinery and the non-metallic mineral products, experienced the worst TFP growth 
rates in 1978-88 years. TFP growth rates of machinery and non-metallic minerals fell to 
-6.9% per annum. It is not surprising that much of the productivity loss in machinery 
occurred in the year of the revolution (over 60% in 1978) when almost all of the large 
firms were confiscated by the new government.  
 
Table 6. Standard TFP growth rates (percent) 
 
                 
Industry (2 digit ISIC rev.2)  1972-77  1978-88  1989-98  1972-98 
Food and beverages  2.7  -3.1  1.2  -0.2 
Textiles and clothing  1.3  -0.5  -0.7  -0.2 
Chemicals -4.1  -0.5  0.7  -0.9 
Non-metallic  minerals  prod.  5.8 -6.9 0.8  -1.2 
Basic metals  1.0  1.1  -2.8  -0.4 
Machinery  8.1 -6.9 2.6  0.0 
Manufacturing n.c.e**  -0.5  -1.6  2.2  0.1 
All  Mfg.*    3.3 -1.7 1.1  0.5 
Mfg. excluding chemicals*  4.7  -3.3  1.1  0.1 
*Value added weighted average 




Table 7. Three-year average share of sectoral value added and 
employment 
   
   Value added  Employment 
Sectors  1971-73 1996-98 1971-73 1996-98 
Food  and  beverages.  0.27 0.13 0.18 0.15 
Textiles  and  clothing  0.19 0.09 0.35 0.20 
Chemicals  0.16 0.21 0.08 0.13 
Non-metallic  minerals  prod. 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.15 
Basic  metals  0.05 0.16 0.02 0.08 
Machinery  0.21 0.26 0.18 0.24 
Mfg.  n.c.e.*  0.05 0.04 0.06 0.06 
*Including ISIC 33, 34 and 39         
 
With the war ending in the summer of 1988, productivity growth picked up again after 
11 years of decline.  Total manufacturing TFP growth rate averaged 1.1% per annum in 
the post-war period of 1989-98. However most of this productivity gain was achieved in 
the early post war period, 1998-91, where the reconstruction of some of the damaged 
infrastructure during the war allowed for a better utilization of the existing excess 
capacities in manufacturing sector.  The total manufacturing TFP growth rate for the 
1991-98 is only 0.1%. In this period, non-metallic minerals and food are the only two  
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sectors that show some modest productivity improvement (1% and 0.8% respectively). 
At the same time, basic metals, textiles and machinery, the three thriving sectors in the 
1972-77 years, experienced sizable productivity deteriorations (-2.6%, -1.2 and –0.4 
respectively). These sectors are in fact amongst some of the most dynamic 
manufacturing industries in South Korea and Malaysia (see footnotes of Table 3 for 
some references). That means in the machinery sector for example while South Korea 
has achieved 50% to 140% productivity improvement in the last 20 years Iran has 
experienced about –50% productivity deterioration, a trend that seems to be continuing 
to date. 
 
Table 8. Standard TFP growth rates (percent) 
  
           
Industry (3 digit ISIC rev.2)  1982-88  1989-98  1982-98  1992-98 
Food products  -0.8  1.3  0.4  0.2 
Food n.c.e  -2.6  0.1  -1.0  -1.0 
Beverages -2.9  2.5  0.3  1.4 
Tobacco products  -5.2  4.7  0.6  4.6 
Textiles   -1.2  -0.4  -0.7  -0.1 
Clothing   0.9  -4.2  -2.1  -3.4 
Leather products  0.3  -1.4  -0.7  -0.8 
Footwear   1.4  -1.6  -0.4  0.0 
Wood products, except furniture  -4.4  -0.7  -2.2  0.7 
Furniture   -8.4  2.2  -2.2  -0.5 
Paper and products  -5.3  1.0  -1.6  -0.3 
Printing and publishing  -3.5  1.5  -0.6  2.5 
Industrial Chemicals  0.0  0.9  0.5  -3.8 
Other Chemicals  0.8  0.7  0.7  -0.5 
Refineries & misc. pet. Prod.  -29.1  -1.6  -12.9  -1.5 
Rubber products  -1.4  -0.3  -0.7  -2.1 
Plastic products  -1.3  -2.2  -1.8  -3.1 
Pottery & Glass  -3.7  -4.0  -3.9  -0.8 
Non-metallic minerals prod. n.c.e  -9.9  1.9  -3.0  1.9 
Iron and Steel  4.9  -3.1  0.2  -2.5 
Non-ferrous metals  3.4  -2.4  0.0  -1.6 
Fabricated Metal products  -7.8  -1.1  -3.8  -2.9 
Machinery, except electrical  -2.8  1.9  0.0  -0.9 
Electrical goods  -4.0  1.6  -0.7  0.1 
Transport equipment  -6.4  5.9  0.8  -5.2 
Professional and scientific equip.  -7.2  6.5  0.8  5.8 
Manufacturing n.c.e  -3.0  0.8  -0.7  -1.7 
All Mfg.*    -1.9  1.3  0.0  -0.2 
Mfg. excluding chemicals*  -1.7  1.3  0.1  -0.2 




Table 8 presents total factor productivity growth for Iran’s 27 manufacturing 
industries for four time periods of 1982-88, 1989-1998, 1982-98 and 1992-98. Detailed 
annual TFP growth rates for the 1980-1998 period in presented in the appendix. 
Estimated TFP measures in some sectors show unusually large variation in 1980 and  
1981. This could be related to the way the capital stock series is constructed for the 27 
industries. This table conveys the same information as of Table 7 in more details. The 
1.3% average TFP growth rate in 1989-1998 seems to be mostly due to growth in the 
years immediately after the Iran-Iraq war. If we exclude the 3 years between 1989 and 
1991, the average declines to –0.02%. This latter figure is more likely to represent the 
current trend in Iranian manufacturing industry. 
 
5.2 Estimation under imperfect competition and non-CRS 
5.2.1 Production technology and market structure 
 
Now we examine the validity of perfect competition and constant returns to scale 
assumption made in the estimation of the “standard” TFP in section 3. This can be 
established by estimating equation (17). First we apply equation (17) to the time series 
cross-section data on 7 Iranian manufacturing sectors in the 1972-98 period. The results 
are reported in Table 9. 
The sum of the time dummy variables measures total manufacturing average 
annual total factor productivity growth. Coefficients of x and dK/K respectively 
measure returns to scale and markup pricing. The dummy variable for 1978 picks up the 
negative productivity shock of the revolution. The dummy variables for 1986 and 1987 
pick up the destructive effects of the last two years of the Iran-Iraq war. In these two 
years alone Iranian manufacturing suffered 29 percent productivity loss. The war ended 
in the summer of 1988. Some of the productivity loss in the last two years was 
recovered in the second half of 1988. 
The expected TFP growth rate of total manufacturing is equal to the sum of the dummy 
variables which is nearly zero percent (0.04%). Note that manufacturing TFP  growth 
rate prior to the revolution averaged 4% per annum. Manufacturing TFP growth rate 
since the end of Iran-Iraq war has averaged only 1%. The coefficients of x and dK/K 
indicate the presence of slight markup pricing and decreasing returns to scale. However 
the null hypothesis of perfect competition or constant returns to scale cannot be rejected 
at 95% significance level. But once the panel data is divided into two sub-periods of pre  
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and post 1978 revolution we can see significant market imperfection and diseconomies 
of scale in the 1979-98 period. The results of these regressions are reported in Table 10.  
 
 
Table 9. Estimations of  Mfg. TFP growth, markup and 
returns to scale 
    
Period: 1971-1998       
Estimation Method: GLS    
Total Panel Obs'n: 189    
Variables   Coefficient       T-statistics 
X  1.03  18.34 
dK/K  0.84  8.81 
Dummy 1972  0.05  1.66 
Dummy 1973  0.02  0.82 
Dummy 1974  0.06  1.93 
Dummy 1975  0.01  0.27 
Dummy 1976  0.05  1.85 
Dummy 1977  0.05  1.70 
Dummy 1978  -0.11  -4.10 
Dummy 1979  0.02  0.69 
Dummy 1980  0.02  0.55 
Dummy 1981  0.02  0.79 
Dummy 1982  0.00  -0.10 
Dummy 1983  0.03  0.95 
Dummy 1984  -0.01  -0.27 
Dummy 1985  0.00  -0.05 
Dummy 1986  -0.08  -2.98 
Dummy 1987  -0.21  -7.76 
Dummy 1988  0.13  4.71 
Dummy 1989  -0.03  -0.93 
Dummy 1990  0.08  2.79 
Dummy 1991  -0.02  -0.66 
Dummy 1992  -0.01  -0.29 
Dummy 1993  0.01  0.40 
Dummy 1994  0.04  1.07 
Dummy 1995  -0.01  -0.31 
Dummy 1996  -0.01  -0.27 
Dummy 1997  0.04  1.41 
Dummy 1998  -0.02  -0.86 
    
R-squared  0.83   
Adjusted R-squared  0.81   
S.E. of regression  0.10   
F-statistic  28.87   





Table 10. Estimations of Mfg. TFP growth, markup and returns 
to scale 
 
    
Period 1972-78  1979-98 
Estimation   GLS*  GLS* 
Total panel observations    49  140 
Variables   Coefficient/Std error (in parenthesis) 
X 0.88  1.11 
  (0.09) (0.09) 
dK/K 0.92  0.80 
  (0.10) (0.12) 
    
R-squared 0.89  0.86 
Adjusted R-squared  0.87  0.83 
Durbin-Watson stat  2.02  2.24 
*Statistics of the dummy variables are not reported 
 
A joint null hypothesis of perfect competition and constant return to scale cannot be 
rejected for the 1972-78 period but the hull hypothesis is rejected at more than 95% 
confidence level. A single hypothesis of perfect competition and constant return to scale 
is rejected at more than 90% confidence level for the 1979-98 period. 
  Given the large share of public firms in manufacturing and the extent of support 
they receive the presents of mark up pricing and decreasing returns to scale in Iran is 
understandable. While 90% of firms with more than 10 employees are private in Iran 
over 50% of manufacturing value added is produced in public firms (65% in 1989 and 
53% in 1998). These firms are typically large with more than 50 workers (92% in 1989 
and 61% in 1998). The restrictive trade policies practiced in the 80’s and most of the 
90’s provided a virtual monopoly position to a number of large scale public firms in 
Iran. In this period while imports of nearly all of consumer goods were severely 
restricted or outright forbidden imports of intermediate and investment goods were 
heavily subsidized via multiple foreign exchange policies. The foreign exchange rate 
designated for intermediate and capital goods imports was less than 95% of its market 
value for a number of years. In this situation public firms specially, the large ones with 
strong influential patrons would receive larger foreign exchange rations.  
Management of nearly all of the large-scale manufacturing firms in Iran changed 
after 1979. Properties of many prominent industrialists were confiscated following the 
revolution and new managers were appointed by the state. It is estimated that there are 
over 2500 public firms in Iran. But only 600-700 are listed in the general budget. The 
status of the remaining two third is not quite clear. A large number of these firms are  
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organized into a few semi-public foundations called “bonyad” (foundation in Farsi). 
Bonyads were originally created to preserve the Islamic principles and help the poor. 
But now they are semi-independent semi-public conglomerates that are involved in 
various economic and charitable activities. Not much is known about bonyads. The 
president of a bonyad is directly appointed by the supreme leader and is answerable 
only to him. They get some funding from Management and Plan Organization (without 
presenting any balance sheet of their operations). The bonyads have easy access to 
cheap foreign exchange allocation and low-cost nationalized bank credits.
5  
Much of public investment in Iran is made by public firms. It is only natural that 
public firms, especially those in bonyads get the most lucrative contracts. In fact, the 
investment decisions themselves (or industrial and public policy for that matter) are 
often made under the strong influence of the patrons of these firms. Thus the presents of 
decreasing returns to scale in Iranian manufacturing sector might in fact be a reflection 
of inefficient public management often subject to intense rent seeking activities.  
Table 11 presents estimates of sectoral markup and scale economies for 7 
manufacturing sectors for two sub-periods of 1972-98 and 1978-98. In the 1972-98 
period 5 out of 7 industries have estimated mark-ups greater then one. But none of them  
are significantly different from one at more than 95% significance level. In this period 5 
out of 7 have estimated increasing and 2 have estimated decreasing return to scale. 
However only one of these industries (basic metals) has a scale economy that is 
significantly lower than one. A joint hypothesis of perfect competition and CRS is can 
be rejected at more than 90% significance level in the 1978-98 period. At the sectoral 
level, two industries (food and Mfg n.c.e.) have mark-ups greater than one at more than 
95% significance level and two sectors (food and basic metals) have returns to scale less 
than one at more than 95% significance level.  
 
 
                                                 
5 One of these, Bonyad Mosfazan va Janbazan (BMJ) is the largest conglomerate in Iran. According to its 
own Web page (www.iran-bonyad.org), “[BMJ is] presently the largest economic section in Iran, second 
only to government…[BMJ is] active in most outstanding industrial and business sectors: food and 
beverages, chemicals, cellulose items, metals, petrochemicals, construction materials, dams, towers, civil 
development, farming, horticulture, animal husbandry, tourism, transportation, five-star hotels, 
commercial services, financing, joint ventures, etc. Added to these, is the special legal status of bonyad 
which is considered to be the most unchallenged private enterprise in Iran.” BMJ alone is believed to own 
over 25 percent of the non-oil economy.  
 
22
Table 11. Estimations of Mfg. TFP growth, markup and returns to scale 
 
    
Period 1972-1998  1978-1998 
Estimation Method  GLS  GLS* 
Total panel observation  189  140 
Variables   Coefficient/Std error (in parenthesis) 
Markup in          
   Food  1.10  (0.11)  1.12  (0.09) 
   Textiles  1.02  (0.11)  1.05  (0.15) 
   Chemicals  1.26  (0.16)  1.29  (0.21) 
   Non-metallic mineral prod.  1.06  (0.17)  0.99  (0.20) 
   Basic metals  0.79  (0.15)  0.67  (0.18) 
   Machinery  0.89  (0.15)  1.02  (0.14) 
   Mfg. N.c.e.  1.05  (0.15)  1.40  (0.15) 
Returns to scale in         
   Food  0.69  (0.26)  0.51  (0.34) 
   Textiles  0.65  (0.24)  0.09  (0.49) 
   Chemicals  0.75  (0.15)  0.73  (0.35) 
   Non-metallic mineral prod.  0.96  (0.19)  0.53  (0.38) 
   Basic metals  0.71  (0.14)  0.64  (0.15) 
   Machinery  0.98  (0.29)  0.92  (0.37) 
   Mfg. n.c.e.  0.93  (0.26)  0.45  (0.38) 
      
R-squared  0.84  0.87  
Adjusted  R-squared  0.80  0.84  
Durbin-Watson  stat  2.21   2.14  
*Statistics for the dummy variables are not reported 
 
Application of equation (17) to 27 Iranian manufacturing sectors for the 1980-
1998 period is presented below (standard errors in parentheses):. 
dQ/Q =  -0.02   +   1.14 x  +   0.96 dK/K        (19) 
     (0.005)     (0.023)      (0.056) 
N=513   R-squared= 80,   DW=2.4 
 
The results of this regression shows that mark-up pricing has become a common 
practice in Iranian manufacturing sector in the post revolution period. The detailed 







Table 12. Estimations of Mfg. TFP growth, markup and returns to scale 
        
Estimation Method: Pooled GLS             
Dependent variables: growth rates of output       
Total panel observations: 513         
Period: 1980-1998         
Sector Markup  (µ) Std-error 
Returns to 
scale   Std-error 
Food products  1.26  0.13  0.87  0.38 
Food n.c.e  1.00  0.07  0.38  0.34 
Beverages 1.42  0.25  0.95  0.31 
Tobacco products  0.43  0.59  -0.27  1.07 
Textiles 1.11  0.14  0.63  0.33 
Clothing 1.16  0.10  0.73  0.53 
Leather products  1.26  0.08  1.03  0.64 
Footwear 0.85  0.29  1.82  1.21 
Wood products, except furniture  1.22  0.11  0.71  0.44 
Furniture 1.19  0.12  1.00  0.36 
Paper and products  1.28  0.19  1.41  0.39 
Printing and publishing  0.95  0.20  0.89  0.55 
Industrial Chemicals  1.04  0.09  0.85  0.10 
Other Chemicals  1.24  0.09  0.63  0.52 
Refineries & misc. pet. Prod.  1.59  0.33  1.79  0.69 
Rubber products  1.07  0.08  1.04  0.11 
Plastic products  1.23  0.08  -0.48  0.40 
Pottery & Glass  1.23  0.47  0.12  0.71 
Non-metallic Minerals prod. n.c.e  1.15  0.18  0.81  0.49 
Iron and Steel  0.76  0.21  0.78  0.15 
Non-ferrous Metals  1.09  0.12  0.92  0.14 
Fabricated Metal Products  1.08  0.15  1.09  0.36 
Machinery, except electrical  1.22  0.13  1.57  0.38 
Electrical Goods  0.82  0.13  0.77  0.28 
Transport Equipment  1.38  0.17  1.06  0.44 
Professional and Scientific Equipment. 0.66 0.19  0.97  0.63 
Manufacturing n.c.e  0.51  0.28  0.71  0.39 
        
R-squared 0.86       
Adjusted R-squared  0.84       
Durbin-Watson stat  2.42         
 
According to the results in Table 12 out of 27 manufacturing industries 16 have 
estimated mark up greater than one and 18 have decreasing returns to scale. To test for 
the significance of non-CRS technology and imperfect competition Wald test was 
conducted. The null hypothesis perfect competition (PC) and the joint hypothesis of PC 
and CRS are both rejected at more than 99% confidence. At the sectoral level the null 
hypothesis of constant returns to scale is rejected for 4 industries at more than 95% 
significance level. The null hypothesis of perfect competition is 6 industries at more  
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than 95% significance level and that of 10 industries at more than 90% significance 
level. 
 
5.2.2  Measure of TFP growth adjusted for imperfect competition and non-CRS 
 
The result of application of equation (18) to standard TFP growth rate of Table 6 is 
presented in Table 13. This table presents TFP growth estimates for Iran’s 7 major 
manufacturing industries adjusted for market imperfections and non-constant return to 
scale technology for four sub-periods during the 1972-1998 period. Annual sectoral 
adjusted TFP growth rates are given in the appendix.  
 
Table 13. TFP growth rates adjusted for market imperfections (percent) 
   
                 
Industry (2 digit ISIC rev.2)  1972-77  1978-88  1989-98  1972-98 
Food and beverages  4.3  -2.2  1.4  0.6 
Textiles and clothing  2.4  -1.7  -0.1  -0.2 
Chemicals  2.1 -0.2 1.7  1.0 
Non-metallic  minerals  prod.  2.8 -6.5 0.8  -1.7 
Basic metals  1.8  1.9  -0.8  0.9 
Machinery  5.8 -5.6 1.8  -0.3 
Manufacturing n.c.e  -2.0  -1.4  3.9  0.5 
All  Mfg.*    4.1 -1.4 1.6  0.9 
Mfg. excluding chemicals*  4.2  -2.9  1.5  0.3 
*Value added weighted average         
 
Two observations can be made when comparing Table 13 with Table 6. First, 
the adjusted TFP growth rates are generally higher than the standard ones, especially in 
the periods that capital accumulation grew faster relative to material and labor inputs 
such as the 1972-77 and the 1989-98. Second, while there are large differences between 
the adjusted and the standard TFP growth rates in the sectoral level, at the aggregate 
level the differences are relatively very small (in the magnitude of a few tenth of 
percentage points).   
Table 14 presents the adjusted total factor productivity growth for Iran’s 27 
manufacturing industries for four sub-periods of 1982-88, 1989-1998, 1982-98 and 
1992-98. The detailed annual TFP growth rates in the 1980-1998 years are presented in 




Table 14. TFP Growth Rates adjusted for market imperfections (percent) 
 
           
Industry (3 digit ISIC rev.2)  1982-88  1989-98  1982-98  1992-98 
Food  products  -0.3 1.1 0.5 0.4 
Food  n.c.e  -2.4 4.2 1.5 3.8 
Beverages  -2.5 2.8 0.6 1.9 
Tobacco  products  -5.0 4.1 0.3 4.2 
Textiles    -1.4 1.2 0.1 1.5 
Clothing    0.5 -3.3 -1.8 -3.2 
Leather  products  -0.8 0.1 -0.3 -0.4 
Footwear    2.1 -1.8 -0.2 -0.4 
Wood products, except furniture  -2.8  1.7  -0.1  2.3 
Furniture    -5.3 2.4 -0.8 -0.4 
Paper  and  products  -3.7 -0.5 -1.8 -1.9 
Printing  and  publishing  -3.7 1.3 -0.7 2.4 
Industrial  Chemicals  0.3 4.6 2.8 1.5 
Other  Chemicals  -0.6 -0.7 -0.7 -1.3 
Refineries & misc. pet. Prod.  -19.7  0.6  -7.8  1.5 
Rubber  products  -2.0 0.0 -0.8 -1.8 
Plastic  products  -1.4 -2.0 -1.8 -2.0 
Pottery  &  Glass  -2.8 -3.3 -3.1 -0.8 
Non-metallic minerals prod. n.c.e  -8.4  0.6  -3.1  -0.2 
Iron  and  Steel  5.9 0.8 2.9 0.2 
Non-ferrous  metals  3.6 -0.8 1.0 -0.4 
Fabricated  Metal  products  -7.3 -1.4 -3.8 -3.2 
Machinery, except electrical  -3.3 -0.3 -1.5 -2.5 
Electrical  goods  -4.0 2.2 -0.4 0.5 
Transport  equipment  -0.9 0.2 -0.2 -7.7 
Professional and scientific  equip.  -6.3 8.7 2.5 8.0 
Manufacturing  n.c.e  0.7 2.5 1.8 1.3 
All  Mfg.*    -1.4 1.3 0.2 0.2 
Mfg. excluding chemicals*  -1.3  1.3  0.3  0.2 
* Value added weighted average         
 
productivity trend in Iranian manufacturing. The performance of the economy in this 
period can be viewed as the steady state condition of the post revolution policies in Iran. 
This is a period that the state is politically stabilized and is not faced with any 
significant internal or external threat. This is also a period in the economy has recovered 
from much of the war damages (i.e., the 3 immediate post-war are excluded). A 
comparison of the adjusted TFP growth rates (Tables 13 and 14) with the standard ones 
(Tables 7 and 8) shows that while there is not much difference between the two 
measures of TFP growth rates in the aggregate (i.e., -0.2% versus 0.2% annual growth 
rate for the whole manufacturing). There is a significant improvement in TFP growth 
measurements at sectoral levels. However, the gist of the message is still the same:  
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Iranian manufacturing continues to have a serious productivity slow down since the 
1978 revolution. 
The six sectors of food, industrial chemical, non-metallic mineral products, iron 
and steel and transport equipment roughly have equal size in terms of sectoral share of 
value added (10% each). Amongst these sectors only industrial chemicals has 
experienced a sizable productivity growth. The productivity growth rates of the 
remaining sectors are either very small (such as food 0.4% and iron and steel 0.2%) or 
negative (i.e. transport equipment –7.7%
6 and iron and steel –0.2). 
 
 
5.3 Explaining standard TFP growth slow down 
5.3.1 Time series study of 7 manufacturing sectors in 1972-98 
 
To explain TFP growth first we use weighted average of “standard” sectoral TFP 
growth rates in the 1972-1998 period (STFP) and regress it against a number of 
macroeconomic variables that are thought to have an influence on productivity growth. 
The least square estimate of the manufacturing TFP growth yielded the following result 
(t-statistics in parentheses): 
 
dSTFP = -0.08  +  0.17 PVTINVS – 0.05 EXPG      (20) 
       (-2.1)     (2.4)                     (-2.0) 
  Number of observations = 27, R
2 = 0.27, Durbin-Watson = 2.3 
 
Where PVTINVS is the private share of aggregate investment in machinery (i.e, 
purchases of machinery and equipment for investment purposes in the whole economy) 
and EXPG is the growth rate of manufacturing exports. The regression above suggests 
that 10% increase in PVTINVS would increase the growth rate of manufacturing total 
factor productivity by 1.7%, which is quite a lot. This is of course expected. The private 
share of aggregate investment in machinery was 0.72 in 1972. But as the state took a 
more active role in the economy with the increase in its oil revenues this share began to 
decrease. In 1977 private share of aggregate investment in machinery was down to 0.45. 
                                                 
6 . It is interesting to note that the Iranian and the Korean auto manufacturing industries began production 
about the same time in the mid 1960’s. Some politicians now in Iran pride themselves by calling Paykan, 
the oldest brand of automobile made in Iran, a completely national car that almost all its parts are made 
domestically. However it is doubtful that this product can compete in the international market.  
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Private investment continued to decline down as a share of total investment in 
machinery and it reached its lowest point of merely 0.13 in 1987 (at the pick of the Iran-
Iraq war). Private investment after the war increased to 56 percent of total. This share 
has continued to increase in the 90’s to the extent that in 1998 the PVTINS is equal to 
what it was in 1972 that is 0.72. However there is much more to the explanation of TFP 
growth than what private investment share can reveal (apparent from the regression’s 
low R
2), in fact private investment shares in the 90’s was on average higher than those 
in the 1971-77 years while TFP growth rates were much lower in the 90’s.  
The negative effect of export growth on manufacturing TFP growth is not in 
lines with conventional wisdom. Manufacturing exports in Iran has never been an 
important source of foreign exchange earning. At most they could finance 1/60 to 1/70 
of imports in the mid 1970’s. With the rise of oil revenues manufacturing exports 
decreased due to strong domestic demand in the 70’s. They decreased further following 
the 1978 revolution and became nearly negligible in early 1980’s. For most of the 
period under study foreign exchange policies were strongly against manufacturing 
exports. Manufacturing exports have often been limited to very large public firms. 
Based on 1995 manufacturing survey data 70% of manufacturing exports are made by 
firms with more than 1000 employees of which nearly 90% are public. This is when 
manufacturing exports had already been quadrupled from their low figure in mid 80’s. 
In the 80’s exports were even more concentrated in large public firms. When we divided 
our sample into two sub-period of before and after 1989 then while the coefficient of 
exports remained negative for the first period it became positive for the second period. 
This might be interpreted a regime change in trade policy in the 90’s. However because 
of our very small sample size nothing definite can be said about this.  The effects of 
change in inflation rate, exchange rate stability were also tested in the above regression 
but none of them had any significant effect of the manufacturing TFP growth rates.  
Now we use the “adjusted” TFP growth rates in equation (10) to explain 
manufacturing total factor productivity growth. The least square estimate of the 
manufacturing TFP growth yielded the following result (t-statistics in parentheses): 
 
dTFP = -0.07  +  0.17 PVTINVS – 0.05 EXPG      (21) 
       (-1.8)       (2.3)                    (-1.9) 
    N = 27, R




This regression is not any better than the one reported above. This is expected since 
there are not large appreciable differences between the standard and the adjusted TFP 
growth rates at the manufacturing aggregate level.  
 
5.3.2 Cross-section study of 27 manufacturing industries 
 
Now we use industry specific characteristics to explain productivity growth in the 
manufacturing sector. As mentioned earlier at the time of the study only the 1995 
manufacturing survey data was available to the authors. Thus in explaining the 
productivity dynamics we are limited to some data for the 1989-98 period and more 
detailed data for 1995. To explain the dynamics of TFP growth we construct a series of 
ten-year average growth rates of a number of variables such as TFP, export share of 
value added in 1995, capital-labor ratio in 1989, number of firms (in thousands) in 
1989, percentage change in the number of firms in 1989-1998, private share of output in 
1989 and the share of employees with at least a high school diploma in 1995 for 27 
manufacturing industries.  
We start with the “standard” 10-year average TFP growth rate (dSTFP), and 
regress it private share of output in 1995 (PVTQS), export share in 1995 (EXPS95), 
capital-labor ratio in 1989 (KLR89) and percentage change (in absolute terms) in the 
number of firms in the industry from 1989 to 1998 (PCNF) in 27 manufacturing 
industries. The PCNF signifies the ease in which the firms can enter and leave the 
industry and hence an indicator of competitiveness. We employed weighted cross-
section least squares method using sectoral value added shares as weighting series. The 
results of the regression are as the following (t-statistics in parentheses): 
 
dSTFP = -6.62 + 2.51 PVTQS – 2.17 EXPs + 3.47 KLR89 + 3.32 PCNF  (22) 
      (-3.1)   (1.0)     (-0.5)    (3.7)    (2.3) 
        N = 27,      Adj-R
2 = 0.44 
 
  Now we use 10-year average of the adjusted TFP growth rates (dATFP) as our 




dATFP = -2.25 + 5.78 PVTQS + 12.96 EXPs – 1.69 KLR89 + 3.55 PCNF (23) 
      (-2.1)   (4.7)        (6.4)     (3.7)      (5.0) 
        N = 27,      Adj-R
2 = 0.73 
 
A comparison of the two equations indicate that the regression equation that 
employs adjusted TFP growth rates is superior to the one that uses the standard TFP 
growth rates. For the later not only yields inferior explanatory power but more 
importantly it yields results that are potentially misleading. 
The regression in equation (23) implies that private firms experience higher 
productivity growth rates. For every one percent increase in the private share of 
industrial out put TFP growth increases by 5.78%. Export oriented industries experience 
much higher productivity growth. That is for every one percent increase in the export 
share of value added TFP growth rate increases by 13%. Equation (23) indicates that 
capital intensive industries experience lower productivity growth rates. This result is 
somewhat peculiar. If anything one might expect the opposite. One might expect that 
the process of learning by doing in high-tech industries which are often very capital 
intensive result in a larger productivity growth. Perhaps a similar argument has 
persuaded the government to subsidize capital to the extent that it has in the last two 
decades. Industrial investment has been subsidized in Iran mainly through foreign 
exchange policies and credit rationing. Imports of capital goods were subsidized in the 
80’s and much of the 90’s. The subsidy rate was often more than 70 percent of market 
values of foreign exchange rate. In addition large scale public firms enjoyed sizable 
investment credit from public banks with negative real interest rates. And finally 
positive coefficient of PCNF indicates that industries with higher entry and exit rates 
experience higher productivity growth. That is industries that are in a more competitive 
environment experience higher productivity growth. 
A number of sector specific characteristics such as the educational level of 
employees, research and development expenditure, years of employees experience and 
such were tried in regression equations (22) and (23) but non of them provided 
satisfactory result. One variable, the share of employees with at least a high school 
diploma seemed to be promising. However this variable is highly correlated with the 
private share of sectoral output. Public firms in general employ more educated labor 
force nevertheless their productivity growth is smaller than private firms.  
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6.  Conclusion 
 
We found that nearly half of near 11 percent difference in the performance of Iranian 
economy before and after the 1978-79 revolution can be explained by the productivity 
differential in the two periods. Manufacturing is one of the sectors that is hit the hardest. 
The productivity growth rate of this sector for the five years before the revolution was 
more than 4 percent which fell to less than negative one percent in the years after the 
revolution. Some of these productivity differentials can be explained by the chaos of 
1978 and the destructions of the Iran-Iraq war. But highly restrictive trade policies and 
the industrial policies in support of large scale public firms have also played an 
important role in creating a non competitive environment. In this paper we explained 
part of this change in productivity by using a measure of Tornquist index of TFP 
corrected for market imperfection and non-constant returns to scale technology. We 
found that private participation is the most significant explanator for the time-series and 
cross section variation in TFP.  
Yet, a significant part of the variations in productivity remain unexplained. The 
change in economic environment after the Islamic revolution is more profound that the 
mere change public/private share of economic activity. Enforcing discipline in the work 
place especially that of larger private manufacturing firms became very difficult or even 
dangerous. In addition to the constant threat of confiscation private manufacturers had 
to deal with a work force that felt that the time of labor “exploitation” and “capitalistic 
mastery” is gone. In larger firms the interference of workers in managerial decisions 
were given a legal status in the form of participation of Islamic worker committees.  
One crucial element of change in the economic environment of Iran after the 
revolution is the prevalence of predatory attitude of public sector toward private sector. 
With the establishment and the spread of semi-public conglomerates (Bonyad), the state 
practically exploited any lucrative business opportunity that it could. Thus private 
business was viewed as a rival to public business and subject to formal or more often 
informal pressure to withdraw or share the pie with government officials. Business 
activities were not limited to large conglomerates. In early 1990’s various branches of 
the armed forces and even the intelligence service joined the crowed. As a result the 
budget of public firms as a share GDP increased from 16.8% in 1989 to 42% in 1998
7. 
                                                 
7 Budget laws and Economic Reports of Central Bank various years.  
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While the share of their debt to total public dept to central bank increased from 7.9% to 
39.7% in the same period. And yet this is only the tip of the iceberg as these figures 
reflect only the public firms and not the semi-public ones of Bonyad. Hence Iranian 
economy of at least 1990’s can be characterized as one of monopolistic with decreasing 
return to scale as our results indicate.    
Uncertainties about property laws, arbitrariness in their enforcement, changes of 
laws regarding foreign direct investment, recurrent turmoil in foreign policy and the U.S 
trade embargo against Iran are just a few examples of issues that potentially have great 
impact on productivity but I have not taken these issues into account.  Our incomplete 
success in explanation of the sources of economic growth and stagnation in the last 
three or four decades resonates Stiglitz (1996) findings when he looks for the sources of 
East Asian growth miracle that 
“The engine metaphor has some important limitations: it encourages a 
search for particular factors that account for growth, although it may in 
fact be the system as a whole, including the interactions among the parts, 
that account for growth., …., The real miracle of East Asia may be 
political more than economic: why did government undertake these 
policies? Why did politicians or bureaucrats not subvert them for their 
own self-interest? Even here, the East Asian experience has many 
lessons, particularly the use of incentives and organizational design 
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